Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Section III

Synopsis/Primer

At this point Kant has already defined moral law in section two along with the categorical imperative. The next logical question to be asked, then, is how can the categorical imperative be binding on us?Or, in a more general sense, how is morality possible at all?. Essentially, this section serves as the justification for what has been previously defined.

Kant starts by arguing that to be morally responsible, humans must be free, because obligation makes no sense if all actions are fully determined by nature. Interestingly, Kant proposes the idea that we can view ourselves in just two distinct ways: as natural beings governed by cause and effect, or as rational beings capable of freedom. If we truly are rational, then we are autonomous agents who can give laws to ourselves through reason and thus what makes the categorical imperative binding on us.

Overall, section three connects ethics with metaphysics by showing that morality depends on seeing ourselves as members of a rational, self-governing system beyond mere nature.

Overview

Kant starts this section off strong. He tells the reader immediately that freedom may only be achieved through rationality and will. Freedom, however, still requires laws, because if something causes something else, it must follow some rule or law. A distinction must be made, though, between the two types of causality, namely natural necessity, where actions are determined through external causes, and freedom, where your will is determined by a special type of law. Here, this "special law" is autonomy, or the will giving the law to itself. It follows, at least in Kant's mind, that one should only act on maxims that you could will to be universal laws. This is the categorical imperative.

If morality serves as a law for rational beings and it must be derived solely from the property of freedom, then freedom must also be proved as a property of rational beings. In other words, Kant begins to discuss the relationship between will, rationality, and freedom. He claims that if one has a will, then one is free. A will can not be a will without the property of freedom. However, it still isn't clear as to why these principles or morality and supposed "universal laws" are satisfactory and are the highest interest of rational individuals. Additionally, how can you justify the claim that it is worth it to give up everything that provides a worth to our conditionI.e. happiness in order to regard ourselves as "free"?

Humans occupy two different "standpoints" at the same time. The first being the standpoint of freedom. This happens when you are deciding what do to. In this case, you view yourself as the starting point of action. On the other hand and at the same time, we maintain the standpoint of observation, where when we examine our behavior from the outside, our actions become resultsLike eating when we are hungry. This sets up the next stage of Kant's logic as he tries to solve the conflict between free will and determinism. Reason is what distinguishes man from all other things. Yet, in Kant's view, it serves only to bring sensible representations under rules and to unite them under consciousness and creates ideas, which are the limits of understanding itself. A rational being then must regard himself to belonging to the world of understanding rather than the world of sense. Where, in the world of reasoning, laws are grounded solely in reasoning. Furthermore, in this world and through reason, a rational being can only consider the causality of his own will as freedom and autonomy.

Based on the conclusions above, Kant argues and proves that the laws of the world of understanding, reason, and therefore freedom, are regarded as imperatives for him, since even the ground of sense is built about the world of understanding. Even a "hardened scoundrel" recognizes the value of honesty and benevolence. Regardless of whether this person acts morally or not, they still "wish that he might also be so disposed" to these traits. This wish in and of itself possesses common human reason that acknowledges the rightness or moral action. So then why does he not act good? Kant argues that there is a strong conflict or desire and worth. Our search for satisfaction in the world of sense conflicts with our internal thoughts in the world of understanding. In the world of understanding, we reflect and grow and become a better person, although it does not necessarily bring physical pleasure or satisfy a desire. Kant delivers a striking blow to his argument here, defining moral obligation. The "will", as a member of the world of reason and understanding, is natural and always aimed at the good. However, since we are also at the very same time members of the world of sense, the "will" feels like an "ought" as your desires conflict with reason.

At this point, we see a pivot in the text from internal feelings of morality to a discussion around the external conflict between nature and free will. We must assume that everything follows the laws of nature, but then how can we suppose the idea of freedom even exists? Well, freedom is an "idea" so it doesn't apply.

There is a strong connection between speculative philosophy and practical philosophy. Speculative philosophy is rough and unpolished, but over time as it is developed and made whole it becomes practical philosophy. A key component of practical philosophy is that it can't be attacked. A lot of what Kant argues about in this section is the fact that we coexist in both worlds. This is tricky as there is a tense play between worlds where laws in one world almost oppose laws in the other and may be easily confused. What is important is isolating these worlds and not letting sensibility overstep into understanding and reason. Reason, it is argued, can potentially overstep its bounds by pretending to be cognizant of something it knows nothing about. We simply can comprehend or see freedom, and trying to reason about it would be an overstep in reasoning's capabilities. For the same logic, we can't explain interests, for we are trying to attribute sensibility and find a cause from an idea. It is impossible for us to explain how pure reason can be practical. To go even further, we just have an idea of the world of intelligence/understanding, and even then that is only possible because when we exclude everything from the world of sense, we understand that there is still more. Freedom, thus, is a necessary pressuposition.